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Abstract. We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in diﬀerential informa-
tion economies with a ﬁnite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make
contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private
information modelled as ﬁnite partitions of a compact and metrizable space of
states of nature, we introduce a topology on information that takes into account
the compatibility of information ﬁelds in assessing similarity between private in-
formation ﬁelds. This topology allows us to establish upper semicontinuity of the
private core correspondence.
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11 Introduction
A classic problem in economic theory is that of the continuity of economic behav-
ior with respect to variations in agents’ characteristics. Economies with similar
agents are expected to generate similar outcomes. In the Arrow-Debreu setting,
where agents are characterized by preferences and initial endowments, Kannai
(1970) and Hildenbrand and Mertens (1972) have, respectively, shown upper semi-
continuity of the core and Walrasian equilibrium correspondences. In diﬀerential
information economies, agents are also characterized by their private informa-
tion, so similarity between agents also requires proximity of private information,
evaluated by some topology on the information ﬁelds.
In this paper, as in the previous literature, information is modeled as a ﬁnite
partition on the states of nature such that an agent distinguishes states of nature
that belong to diﬀerent sets of the partition. The question we seek to answer
is: How does an economy respond to small changes in the characteristics of the
agents, including information? To pursue this inquiry, we need a precise notion
of proximity between information ﬁelds. Boylan (1971) proposed a topology
that is analogous to the Hausdorﬀ metric on closed sets. Allen (1983) studied
its properties and proved convergence of consumer demand and continuity of
indirect utility with respect to this topology on information. Cotter (1986, 1987)
introduced a weaker topology, based on the pointwise convergence metric, and
showed that it retains the same properties of continuity of conditional expected
utility and excess demand.
In diﬀerential information economies, the continuity problem is not vacuous. Un-
der general conditions, the Radner equilibrium set and the private core are not
empty. Existence of competitive equilibrium in diﬀerential information econo-
mies was established by Radner (1968, 1982), while the ﬁrst cooperative concepts
were introduced by Wilson (1978): the “ﬁne core” and the “coarse core”. In the
2“ﬁne core”, agents share all information inside the blocking coalition, while in
the “coarse core”, the blocking coalition may only use the common information.
Considering that agents may not have the possibility or interest in sharing infor-
mation, Yannelis (1991) introduced the notion of “private core” and established
its non-emptiness in general conditions. Our preference for this concept is fur-
ther justiﬁed by a result of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that establishes
equivalence between private core and Radner equilibrium in economies with a
continuum of agents.
In this general equilibrium framework, Einy, Haimanko, Moreno and Shitovitz
(2004) used the metric of Boylan to establish upper semicontinuity of the Radner
equilibrium correspondence. They also presented an example showing failures
of upper semicontinuity of the private core, which is also valid with the weaker
topology of Cotter. This failure of upper semicontinuity is an unpleasant result
that brings doubts on the adequacy of the topologies of Boylan and Cotter on
information ﬁelds.
We investigate the continuity properties of the private core and Walrasian equili-
brium correspondences in diﬀerential information economies with a ﬁnite number
of agents, where the private information of each agent is a ﬁnite partition of a
compact and metrizable space of states of the world. This is the setting of the
negative example of Einy et al (2004) that excludes upper semicontinuity of the
private core correspondence. Our contribution is the introduction of a topology on
information in which neighboring information ﬁelds are compatible, in the sense
that they allow essentially the same contingent contracts. This topology allows
us to establish the upper semicontinuity of the private core. We also show that
with private information restricted to ﬁnite partitions, the continuity of Radner
equilibrium result of Einy et al (2004) is still true when the uniform continuity of
the utility functions is relaxed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the diﬀerential informa-
3tion economy is deﬁned, in section 3 the topology on information is introduced,
section 4 establishes upper semicontinuity of the private core and Radner equi-
librium correspondences, and section 5 concludes the paper with an illustration
and some remarks.
2 The Diﬀerential Information Economy
Our framework is the model of a pure exchange economy with diﬀerential infor-
mation (see Radner (1968, 1982)). We consider a ﬁnite number of agents and a
ﬁnite number of goods, `, in each state. N is the set of n traders or agents and,
in every state of nature, the commodity space is the positive orthant of IR`.
The economy extends over two time periods. Consumption takes place in the
second period. In the ﬁrst, there is uncertainty over the states of nature and
agents make contracts that may be contingent on state of nature that occurs in
the second period (ex-ante contract arrangement).
Let (Ω,B,µ) be a probability measure space, describing the exogenous uncer-
tainty, where:
- Ω, compact and metrizable, denotes the possible states of nature;
- B, a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, denotes the set of all events;
- µ, a countably additive probability measure on (Ω,B), gives the (common)
prior of every agent.
In our model of a diﬀerential information exchange economy with a ﬁnite number
of agents, E ≡ (ei,ui,Fi)n
i=1, for each agent i it is assumed that:
41. A ﬁnite partition of Ω, Pi generates the σ-algebra Fi ⊂ B, the private
information of agent i.
2. ui : Ω × IR`
+ → IR+ is the random utility function of agent i. For all ω,
ui(ω,·) : IR`
+ → IR+ is continuous, strictly monotone and concave. And for
every x, ui(·,x) : Ω → IR+ is measurable with respect to B, bounded, and
continuous in the interior of elements of Pi.
3. ei : Ω → IR`
+, representing the random initial endowments of agent i, is
Fi-measurable and strictly positive: ei(ω)  0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
The assumption of strict positivity of initial endowments is often replaced by
n X
i=1
ei(ω)  0 for all ω ∈ Ω, together with “irreducibility” (i.e., the endowment of
every coalition is desired).
Let LXi denote the set of all Fi-measurable selections from the random consump-
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And let LX =
n Y
i=1
LXi. Any element x in LX is called an allocation. With “free








i for (µ-)almost every ω ∈ Ω.























i and Ui(yi) > Ui(xi) for every i ∈ S.
The private core of a diﬀerential information economy E is the set of all feasible
allocations which are not privately blocked by any coalition. Observe that al-
though coalitions of agents are formed, information is not shared between them.
5On the contrary, the redistribution of the initial endowments is based only on
each agent’s private information.
In the context of a diﬀerential information economy, a price system is a B-
measurable, non-zero function π : Ω → IR`
+.

















A pair (π,x) is a Radner equilibrium if π is a price system and x = (x1,...,xn) ∈
LX is a feasible allocation such that, for every i, xi maximizes Ui on Bi(π,ei). No-
tice that traders must balance the budget in the ﬁrst period. Radner equilibrium
is an ex-ante concept.
3 A Topology on Private Information
The previous studies on the continuity of economic behavior with respect to
information (Allen (1983) and Einy et al (2004)) used the topology introduced
by Boylan (1971). This topology is generated by a pseudometric d that assigns a
ﬁnite distance to any pair of σ-algebras, x and y, contained in B.
d(x,y) = supA∈x infB∈y µ(A∆B) + supB∈y infA∈x µ(A∆B).3
Recall that in our model the information of each agent is a σ-algebra, x, generated
by a ﬁnite partition of Ω such that the agent can tell in which of the sets of the
partition lies the actual state of nature.
Let X = { x ⊂ B ; x is the σ-algebra generated by a ﬁnite partition of Ω }.
3A∆B is the symmetric diﬀerence between sets A and B: A∆B ≡ A\B ∪ B\A.
6In this paper, we construct a ﬁner topology than Boylan’s. The central concept
that is used is the “common information”. Given two σ-algebras, x,y ∈ X, the
σ-algebra that represents the “common information” is deﬁned as:
x ∧ y = {A ∈ x : ∃B ∈ y s.t. µ(A∆B) = 0}.
Observe that, in general, x ∧ y 6= y ∧ x. But also that d(x ∧ y,y ∧ x) = 0.
To generate the topology, we use a function, d∗ : X ×X → IR+, deﬁned as the sum
of the Boylan distances from each information set to the common information.
Deﬁnition 1 ∀x,y ∈ X , d∗(x,y) = d(x,x ∧ y) + d(x ∧ y,y) , where d(x,y) is
the Boylan distance between the information ﬁelds.
This function is not a distance, but a related concept that we designate as a
“detachment”, since it satisﬁes the three following properties for all x,y ∈ X:
1. Positivity: d∗(x,y) ≥ 0 and d∗(x,x) = 0;
2. Symmetry: d∗(x,y) = d∗(y,x).4
3. Discrimination: d∗(x,y) = 0 implies that for every set in x there is a set in
y that diﬀers from it by at most a subset of Ω with µ-measure zero;
The “detachment” falls short of being a pseudometric because it violates the
triangle inequality: d∗(x,y) ≤ d∗(x,z) + d∗(z,y) ∀x,y,z ∈ X.
Observe that d∗ deﬁnes an equivalence relation on X. We say that two σ-algebras
x,x0 ∈ X are equivalent if and only if they have a null detachment (x ∼ x0 ⇔
d∗(x,x0) = 0). Let F = X/ ∼ denote the set of equivalence classes of X, that
4To see this, use d(x ∧ y,y ∧ x) = 0.
7is, F = {[x] : x ∈ X}, where [x] = {y ∈ X : d∗(x,y) = 0}. According to the
next proposition, Boylan’s pseudometric, d, deﬁnes exactly the same equivalence
classes.
Proposition 3.1 ∀x,y ∈ X , d∗(x,y) = 0 ⇔ d(x,y) = 0.
Proof. Since d is nonnegative and satisﬁes the triangle inequality, we have:
0 ≤ d(x,y) ≤ d∗(x,y).
On the other hand, d(x,y) = 0 implies that for every set A ∈ x there exists
a set B ∈ y such that µ(x∆y) = 0. But this also means that x ∧ y = x. So,
d∗(x,y) = d(x,x) + d(x,y) = 0 + 0.
QED
We use “open balls”, B
∗(x,) = {y ∈ X : d
∗(x,y) < }, to generate the topology.
In the case of a metric, the triangle inequality ensures that the open balls generate
a topology, that is, that the open sets are arbitrary unions of open balls. In
this case, we must actually prove that the “open balls” produced by d∗ also
generate a topology.5 This is done in three steps, each of them illustrative of the
characteristics of the topology. A ﬁrst lemma shows that in a small “open ball”,
all information partitions have more information than the center. According to
a second lemma, in a small “open ball” all partitions have the same common
information with a third partition. These two lemmas allow us to prove that a
kind of local triangle inequality holds, implying that the “open balls” generated
by d∗ are open sets.
The ﬁrst lemma shows that all information ﬁelds that are very close to the ﬁnite
σ-algebra x have more information than x:
5We opted to generalize the concept of “ball” from distances to “detachment”, but, alter-
natively, a diﬀerent designation can be used, like “open zone” with some “reach” around a
center.
8Lemma 3.1 ∀x ∈ X , ∃δ(x) > 0 such that
d∗(x,y) < δ(x) ⇒ x ∧ y = x.
Proof. Consider an x ∈ X. Since x is a ﬁnite σ-algebra, there exists a ﬁnite




d(x,z) = δ(x) > 0.
By deﬁnition, d∗(x,y) < δ(x) ⇒ d(x,x ∧ y) < δ(x).
Since x ∧ y ⊆ x ⇒ [x ∧ y] = [x]. The way in which x ∧ y is deﬁned implies that
x ∧ y = x.
QED
The following proposition implies that d and d∗ are locally equivalent in a sense
that we make precise.
Proposition 3.2 ∀x ∈ X , ∃δ(x) > 0 such that
d∗(x,y) < δ(x) ⇒ d∗(x,y) = d(x,y).
Proof. By deﬁnition, d∗(x,y) = d(x,x ∧ y) + d(x ∧ y,y).
In the small neighborhood as deﬁned by lemma 3.1, x ∧ y = x.
So, we have: d∗(x,y) = 0 + d(x,y).
QED
Observe that δ deﬁnes a d∗-ball where this equality holds, but not a d-ball. It is
not true that ∃δ(x) > 0 such that d(x,y) < δ(x) ⇒ d∗(x,y) = d(x,y).
Note also that proposition 3.1 is a particular case of proposition 3.2.
A second lemma states that given two information ﬁelds, if one of them varies
slightly, the common information remains the same.
9Lemma 3.2 ∀x,y ∈ X , ∃δ(x,y) > 0 such that
d∗(y,z) < δ(x,y) ⇒ x ∧ y = x ∧ z.
Proof. Consider two arbitrary ﬁnite σ-algebras x,y ∈ F. Consider ﬁrst the
case [x] = [y]. Of course that x ∧ y = x. By lemma 3.1, there exists a δ(y)
such that d∗(y,z) < δ(y) implies that y ∧ z = y. It follows from the deﬁnition
of common information that this operation is associative. So, we have x ∧ y =
x ∧ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ y) ∧ z = x ∧ z.
With [x] 6= [y], and because we are dealing with ﬁnite σ-algebras, there is only




Given x and y, consider δ(y) as in lemma 3.1 and let δ(x,y) = min{,δ(y)}.
From lemma 1, d∗(y,z) < δ(x,y) ⇒ y = y ∧ z ⇒ x ∧ y = x ∧ y ∧ z.
If we assume that x ∧ z 6= x ∧ y ∧ z, then, by the way we deﬁned the “common
information”, we are sure that [x∧z] 6= [x∧y ∧z]. This implies that there exists
Az ∈ z and Ax ∈ x with µ(Az∆Ax) = 0 such that there isn’t any Ay ∈ y with
µ(Az∆Ay) = 0 or µ(Ax∆Ay) = 0. So, min
Ay∈yµ(Az∆Ay) ≥  ≥ δ(x,y).
This implies that d
∗(y,z) ≥ d(y,z) ≥ min
Ay∈yµ(Az∆Ay) ≥ δ(x,y).
We have a contradiction, so x ∧ z = x ∧ y ∧ z = x ∧ y.
QED
We can read the two lemmas together. By lemma 3.1, in a small neighborhood
of an information set, information does not decrease. By lemma 3.2, the pos-
sible increase of information is slight, as the common information with another
information set remains constant.
Theorem 1 is based on a kind of local triangle inequality which implies that all
the points of an “open ball” are “interior points”. A point x is “interior” to A ⇔
∃ > 0 s.t. B∗(x,) ⊂ A. As a consequence, the collection of the “open balls” is
a base for the topology τ∗ = {A : A is a union of open balls }.
10Theorem 1 ∀x ∈ X and  > 0 : B∗(x,) = {y ∈ X : d∗(x,y) < } is open (all
points are interior). The collection of open balls with rational radius is a base for
τ∗. (X,τ∗) is a topological space.
Proof. Given an arbitrary ball B∗(x,), we want to show that all points of
this ball are interior points. Equivalently, that given y ∈ B∗(x,), there exists
δ0(x,y) > 0 such that B∗(y,δ0(x,y)) ⊂ B∗(x,).
Consider some δ(x,y) small enough for lemma 3.2 to hold, and an arbitrary
z ∈ B
∗(y,δ(x,y)).
d∗(x,z) = d(x,x ∧ z) + d(x ∧ z,z) = (by lemma 3.2)
= d(x,x ∧ y) + d(x ∧ y,z) ≤
≤ d(x,x ∧ y) + d(x ∧ y,y) + d(y,z) ≤
≤ d∗(x,y) + d(y,z) ≤
≤ d∗(x,y) + d∗(y,z).
Let δ0(x,y) = min{δ(x,y), − d∗(x,y)}. For any z ∈ B∗[y,δ0(x,y)], we have:
d∗(x,z) ≤ d∗(x,y) + d∗(y,z) ≤ d∗(x,y) +  − d∗(x,y) = .
Thus, the arbitrary y is an interior point. All points in B∗(x,) are interior points.
The sets whose points are all interior are open sets (members of the topology),
since they can be obtained by arbitrary unions of the members of the base. To
see this, consider an arbitrary set A, whose points are all interior.
A = int(A) ⇒ ∀x ∈ A ,∃B
∗(x,x) ⊂ A ⇒
⇒ ∪x∈AB
∗(x,x) ⊂ A ⊂ ∪x∈AB
∗(x,x) ⇒ A is a union of open balls.
11Of course that all the points inside an open set are interior points. A point in
a set that is an union of open sets is interior to at least one of the open sets,
therefore it is also interior to the union.
For the topology to be well deﬁned, a ﬁnite intersection of open sets A must
be open. It is enough to prove that the intersection of two open sets is open.
Consider an arbitrary point a ∈ A = A1 ∩ A2. The point is interior to both
open sets, so each of them contains a ball centered in a. Designate these balls
by B∗(a,r1) ⊂ A1 and B∗(a,r2) ⊂ A2. Pick the smallest radius, w.l.o.g., r1.
Of course that B∗(a,r1) ⊂ A1 and B∗(a,r1) ⊂ A2. This open ball, B∗(a,r1), is
contained in the intersection.
QED
The Boylan topology, deﬁned by d, is a Hausdorﬀ topology on the space of equiv-
alence classes of information σ-algebras. This topology is ﬁner, so it inherits
this property.6 Observe that the topology is ﬁrst countable, as every point has a
countable neighborhood base.7 Thus, to prove upper semicontinuity of the equili-
brium (or private core) correspondence, it suﬃces to show that given a convergent
sequence of economies, the limit of a sequence of equilibrium (private core) allo-
cations of the sequence of economies is an equilibrium (private core) allocation
of the limit economy (see theorem 16.20 of Aliprantis and Border (1999)).
6Given any two distinct points, there are Boylan neighborhoods of each point with null
intersections (the Boylan and Cotter topologies are separated because every topology generated
by a metric is separated). And for every Boylan neighborhood, there is a neighborhood in this
topology that is contained in it, because: ∀x ∈ X, ∈ R+ : B∗(x,) ⊂ B(x,). This implies
that this topology is also separated.
7For every neighborhood of any x, there is an open ball with rational radius centered in x
that is contained in the neighborhood.
124 Upper Semicontinuity of the Private Core
In this section we establish upper semicontinuity of the private core correspon-
dence. We begin by making precise the notion of convergence of economies. Then
we show that given a convergent sequence of economies, the limit of a sequence of
private core allocations of the sequence of economies belongs to the private core
of the limit economy.






k=1 be a sequence of economies with





gence means that, for every agent i ∈ N:
i) ei
k converges to ei
0 in the L`
1-norm;
ii) ui
k converges uniformly to ui
0 on every compact subset of Ω × IR`
+;
iii) F i
k converges to F i
0 in (F,τ∗).
Upper semicontinuity of the Radner equilibrium set and of the private core can be
established with the use of two technical lemmas from Einy et al (2004). The ﬁrst
states that the limit of informationally feasible functions is also informationally
feasible.
Lemma 4.1 Let {Fk}∞
k=1 be a sequence of σ-subﬁelds of F that converges to F0
in Boylan metric, and let {xk}∞
k=1 be a sequence of allocations in L`
1(Ω,F,µ) that
converges to x0 in L`
1-norm.
If for every k, xk is Fk-measurable, then x0 is F0-measurable.
13The second lemma states that the limit of a sequence of utilities equals the limit
utility of the limit allocation. With the consideration of ﬁnite partitions of in-
formation, the similar lemma from Einy et al (2004) that assumes continuous
utility functions in Ω × IR`
+ can easily be extended. It is enough to assume that,
given x, the utility is bounded and continuous in the interior of sets of the agent’s
partition of information.
Lemma 4.2 Let {uk}∞
k=1 be a sequence of random utility functions on Ω × IR`
+.
For all k and all ω ∈ Ω, uk(ω,·) is continuous, concave, non-negative and non-
decreasing. For every x, uk(·,x) : Ω → IR+ is measurable in F, bounded, and
continuous in the interior of the sets of a ﬁnite partition of Ω. Assume that
{uk}∞
k=1 converges to a function u0 uniformly on every compact subset of Ω×IR`
+.
In these conditions, if {xk}∞
k=1 is a sequence in L`











The following theorem, from Einy, Haimanko, Moreno and Shitovitz (2004), es-
tablishes upper semicontinuity of the Radner equilibrium correspondence.






k=1 be a sequence of economies with






k=1 is a sequence such that (xk,πk) ∈ RE(Ek) for every k, and for
every i ∈ N:
i) xi
k converges to xi
0 in the L`
p-norm;
ii) πi
k converges to πi
0 in the L`
q-norm;
14then (x0,π0) ∈ RE(E0).
Theorem 3 combines a result of Einy et al (2004) with the topology that we
introduce (lemma 3.1) to establish upper semicontinuity of the private core cor-
respondence.






k=1 be a sequence of economies with





If a convergent sequence of allocations in L`
1, {xk}∞
k=1, with limk→∞ xk = x0, is






k) is a private core allocation in Ek, then






0), is a private core allocation in E0.
The proof is straightforward from lemma 3.1, lemma 4.2 and theorem 2 of Einy,
Haimanko, Moreno and Shitovitz (2004).
5 Concluding Remarks
In the introduction, we mentioned an example presented by Einy, Haimanko,
Moreno and Shitovitz (2004) that excluded upper semicontinuity of the private
core. With our topology, the sequence of economies considered in that example
does not converge. We reproduce the example below.
Consider a sequence of economies, E, with two agents and one commodity, where
only one of the private information ﬁelds varies. The space of possible states of
nature is Ω = [0,1] ∪ [2,3]. The agents have equal initial endowments, indepen-
dent of the state of nature: e(ω) = 1
2. The private information of the agents are









Agent 1 only values consumption only in [0,1], while agent 2 values consumption




x , if ω ∈ [0,1]






0 , if ω ∈ [0,1]
x , if ω ∈ [2,3]
.
The economies diﬀer only in the parameter , which converges to zero. Private




 · χ[0,1]∪[2,2+] + a2
 · χ(2+,3],b1




Feasibility in [0,1], [2,2 + ], and in (2 + ,3] implies that:

     










Since x is a core allocation, a1
 ≥ 1
2, or else U1(e1) > U1(x1














Therefore, the initial endowments form a (constant) sequence of private core allo-
cations, converging, of course, to e = 1
2. In the limit economy, where F 1 = F 2 =
{[0,1],[2,3]}, x = (χ[0,1],χ[2,3]) is the only private core allocation, corresponding
to a situation in which agent 1 consumes everything in [0,1] and agent 2 consumes
everything in [2,3]. Upper semicontinuity of the private core correspondence fails.
Observe that in the sequence of economies E, even for a very small , the common
information of the agents is null. So, agent 1 cannot trade consumption in [2,3]
(which has no value) for consumption in [0,1] (which agent 2 doesn’t value). Their
16information ﬁelds are incompatible, in the sense that they do not allow trades
that are contingent on the states of nature. In the limit economy the agents have
the same information, so they are able to make contingent trades. According
to Boylan’s topology on information, the ﬁelds [0,1] ∪ [2,2 + ],(2 + ,3] and
[0,1],[2,3] are neighbor. Nevertheless, the ﬁrst information is useless for agent 1,
while the second, being compatible with the information of agent 2, is valuable.
With our topology, there is no failure of continuity, because the sequence of
information ﬁelds F
1
 = [0,1] ∪ [2,2 + ],(2 + ,3] does not converge. A sequence
that would actually converge to F
1
0 = [0,1],[2,3] in our topology is, for example,
F
10
 = [0,1],[2,2 + ],(2 + ,3]. But, in this case, contingent trades would be
allowed in the sequence of economies, and not just in the limit economy.
In our topology, two information ﬁelds that are neighbor may diﬀer only in events
that are very unlikely. Notice that F 1
0 and F 10
 diﬀer because while F 1
0 observes
[2,3], F 10
 can distinguish the unlikely event [2,2 + ] from (2 + ,3]. Trades
contingent on realization of [2,3] are allowed. Only trades that are contingent on
a very unlikely event, [2,2 + ], are excluded.
Information ﬁelds that are very close in the topology of Boylan may also diﬀer in
an additional way, by distinguishing diﬀerent but very correlated events. In fact,
F 1
0 and F 1
 diﬀer because they allow the observation of very correlated events:
[0,1] ∪ [2,2 + ] is similar to [0,1]; and (2 + ,3] is similar to [2,3]. Nevertheless,
the common information is null and so contingent agreements are not allowed.
The diﬀerences of the ﬁrst kind only imply that agreements cannot be contingent
on the very unlikely events that ere not commonly observes, and therefore, have a
small impact on economic outcomes. Diﬀerences of the second kind may prevent
valuable agreements, contingent on events that are not commonly observed but
nevertheless probable, and thus may imply very diﬀerent economic outcomes. We
reiterate that this second type of diﬀerences between information ﬁelds that are
17neighbor is allowed by the topology of Boylan but not by the topology that we
introduce.
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